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valuation.
Unfortunately, the instructions to Schedule T, the schedule
on which the family-owned business deduction is claimed,
states as follows—
“For 5 of the 8 years before the decedent’s death, there
was material participation by the decedent or a member
of the decedent’s family in the business to which the
ownership interest relates.”
That passage is obviously based on the relevant language in
the main part of the statute16 b  ignores the modifications at
the end of the statute.17
Also, the instructions to Schedule T state, several
paragraphs farther on, as follows—
“To make the section 2057 election, either the decedent
or a member of the decedent’s family must have
materially participated in the trade or business to which
the ownership interest relates for at least 5 of the 8 years
ending on the date of the decedent’s death.”
Again, that passage is based on the relevant language in the
main part of the FOBD statute18 and ignores the further
guidance on the topic near the end of the statute.19
Moreover, a 1998 Senate Finance Committee report,20 the
General Explanation of Tax Legislation Enacted in 1998 (The
“Blue Book,”)21 the Conference Report to the Taxpayer
Relief Act of 1997,22 a letter from the Joint Committee on
Taxation to Sen. Charles Grassley,23 and the Senate Finance
Committee Report to Accompany the Taxpayer Relief Act of
199724 all contain nearly identical language requiring material
participation for five or more years in the eight-year period
ending on the date of the decedent’s death.
In conclusion
The statute itself is relatively clear as to the pre-death
material participation rule.  Unfortunately, the explanation by
the Internal Revenue Service, the Senate Finance Committee
and the Joint Committee on Taxation reflect only part of the
rule applicable for purposes of the family-owned business
deduction.  Hopefully, the long-awaited regulations under
I.R.C. § 2057 will clarify the situation and confirm the
statutory language.
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CASES, REGULATIONS AND STATUTES
by Robert P. Achenbach, Jr.
BANKRUPTCY
GENERAL   -ALM § 13.03.*
EXEMPTIONS
HOMESTEAD. The debtor was of advanced age and living
in a retirement community when the debtor caused an
automobile accident. The injured party sued the debtor for an
amount in excess of the insurance carried by the debtor. The
debtor’s family members worked with the debtor to convert
most of the debtor’s liquid, non-exempt assets into the
purchase of a residence, effectively removing the assets from
the reach of the injured party who was a creditor in the
bankruptcy case. In order to move to the residence, the debtor
had to hire a live-in nurse. The residence was clearly larger
than needed by the debtor and was expanded in order to use
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up all of the liquid assets. The court held that the debtor was
not entitled to an exemption for the residence because the
residence was purchased as part of a fraudulent transfer. I  re
Sholdan, 217 F.3d 1006 (8th Cir. 2000), aff’g, 218 B.R. 475
(Bankr. D. Minn. 1998), on rem. from, 108 F.3d 886 (8th
Cir. 1997).
Chapter 12   -ALM § 13.03[8].*
APPEALS. The debtor had filed a pro se petition for
Chapter 12 which was dismissed on the motion of a creditor.
The debtor filed two motions for reconsideration but both
were denied. The debtor filed an appeal to the District Court
17 days after the last court order denying reconsideration.
The appeal was dismissed for untimeliness. The debtor
argued that the appeal was timely because the post-dismissal
motions tolled the appeal period. The court held that appeals
had to be filed within 10 days after the order appealed to;
therefore, the debtor’s appeal was untimely filed 17 days
after the last court order. The debtor also argued that the
appeal time should be extended for excusable neglect because
the debtor had filed pro se. The court held that the excusable
neglect provision only applied where the appellant files for an
extension, which the debtor did not do. In addition, a late
appeal is treated as a motion for an extension only in criminal
appeals. In re Williams, 216 F.3d 1295 (11th Cir. 2000).
LEGISLATION .  A reminder that the statute providing for
Chapter 12 expired on June 30, 2000 without extending
legislation at this time. Legislation to make Chapter 12
permanent is pending.
Chapter 13   -ALM § 13.03.*
DISPOSABLE INCOME . The debtor was an attorney
who had three year’s of nondischargeable taxes. The debtor’s
plan provided for full payment of the taxes plus prepetition
interest over five years by monthly payments and an annual
balloon payment. The debtor’s income had fluctuated over
the previous four years and the debtor used the average
income for the first three years in calculating the anticipated
disposable income available to the debtor during the plan.
The fourth year was the year before the bankruptcy case
filing and had a much higher amount of income. The IRS
objected to the plan because it did not include payment of
post-confirmation interest on the tax claims and did not apply
all of the debtor’s disposable income to plan payments. The
IRS argued that the debtor understated the anticipated income
and improperly included private school tuition for the
debtor’s children as a personal expense during the plan. The
court held that the private school tuition was to be included in
disposable income because the children were young and
adequate public schools were available. The court also
recalculated the anticipated income, giving more weight to
the last year before the bankruptcy filing, because the debtor
did not provide any evidence that year’s income was higher
because of unique or extraordinary circumstances. The plan
was not confirmed also because it did not provide for
payment of post-confirmation interest on the tax claims. In re
Weiss, 251 B.R. 453 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 2000).
FEDERAL TAX     -ALM § 13.03[7].*
CLAIMS.  The debtor claimed an exemption for the
debtor’s interest in an ERISA qualified pension plan and the
xemption was allowed. The IRS had filed a secured claim
for taxes based on a prepetition tax lien on the debtor’s
int est in the ERISA plan. The court held that the exempt
property could serve as collateral for the tax lien; therefore,
the tax claim was not secured to the extent of the debtor’s
interest in the ERISA plan. In re Keyes, 2000-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) (Bankr. E.D. Va. 2000).
DISCHARGE. Although the debtor had filed income tax
returns for several years, the debtor stopped filing returns and
paying taxes after deciding that the IRS had no authority to
collect taxes. The debtor continued to refuse to file returns or
pay taxes after assessments by the IRS. The debtor attempted
to hide assets from the IRS by using sham trusts and false
business names for bank accounts and avoiding the use of
checks. Criminal charges were eventually brought against the
debtor who still resisted filing the returns. Eventually the
debtor did file returns but only under court orders. The court
held that the taxes were nondischargeable under Section
523(a)(1)(C) for willfully attempting to evade payment of
taxes. In re May, 251 B.R. 714 (Bankr. 8th Cir. 2000), aff’g,
247 B.R. 786 (Bankr. W.D. Mo. 2000).
The debtor, a self-employed attorney, failed to pay for
federal taxes for three tax years for which returns were filed
more than three years before the Chapter 7 petition. However,
except for some partial payments in later years, the debtor did
not make any estimated tax payments, did not make any
ayments with the returns, and filed all of the returns late by
several months. During these tax years, the debtor had
sufficient funds to make the tax payments and was aware of
the need to make the tax payments. The court held that the
taxes were nondischargeable because the debtor’s failure to
make estimated taxes and to pay the taxes when able were
affirmative acts to attempt to evade or defeat the tax
liabilities. The case is designated as not for publication. In re
Haesloop, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,757 (E.D.
N.Y. 2000).
The IRS filed tax claims for 1991, 1996, 1997 and 1998.
The taxpayers filed for Chapter 7 on August 9, 1999. The
debtors claimed to have filed a tax return for 1991 but did not
produce any evidence of that return or a mailing of the return,
The IRS constructed a substitute return which was not
prepared with the help of the debtors and was not signed by
the debtors. The court held that the 1991 taxes were not
dischargeable because no return had been filed. The tax
claims for the other years were also nondischargeable
because the returns for those years were required to be filed
within three years before the filing of the petition. In re
Villalon, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,753 (Bankr.
N.D. Ohi  2000).
NET OPERATING LOSS. The debtor filed for Chapter 7
and claims for taxes for the previous two tax years were
included in the case. The claim for the first year was
discharged but the pre-bankruptcy tax year claim was not
discharged. The return for the year of the bankruptcy case
was not filed until the following year and included a net
operating loss for which the debtor did not make an election
to carry forward. The debtor argued that the net operating
loss could not be carried back to the first tax year since the
taxes were discharged; therefore, the net operating loss was
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carried back to the pre-bankruptcy year. In a Field Service
Advice letter, the IRS compared the discharged tax year to a
tax year in which it was barred from making an assessment
and cited case authority which allowed the IRS to carry net
operating losses to a year not in issue as a preliminary step to
assessing taxes in a tax year still open for assessment.
Therefore, the IRS ruled that the net operating losses would
have to be applied first to the tax from the discharged tax
year before applying the net operating losses to the pre-
bankruptcy tax year.  FSA Ltr. Rul. 200039007, (June 23,
2000).
CONTRACTS
COMMERCIAL REASONABLENESS OF RESALE
OF GOODS. The defendant had agreed to purchase popcorn
from the plaintiff when the popcorn was still growing. The
popcorn became contaminated with corn smut on the surface
of the stored corn. The parties discussed the situation for
several months after which the defendant rejected the
popcorn. The plaintiff then attempted to resell the popcorn by
sending samples of the popcorn to various buyers. The
samples were taken from the worst part of the stored crop.
The plaintiff received some offers at half of the original
contract price and gave the defendant an option to purchase
the popcorn at the highest bid price. The defendant refused
and the plaintiff sold the popcorn to another buyer. The
plaintiff then sued for the difference between the contract
price and the actual price at which the popcorn was sold. The
plaintiff argued that the defendant failed to timely reject the
popcorn and the defendant countered that the plaintiff did not
resell the popcorn in a commercially reasonable manner. The
court held that the plaintiff followed standard commercial
practice in taking bids and in sending samples of popcorn in
the worst condition. The evidence demonstrated that popcorn
buyers generally want to see the poorest quality sample in
making a bid. The court upheld the jury instruction for timely
rejection, holding that the determination of reasonableness of
the time and manner of rejection is a fact issue for the jury.
Smith v. Paoli Popcorn Co., 260 Neb. 460, __ N.W.2d __
(Sept. 29, 2000).
COOPERATIVES
NEWS ITEM. The Associated Press has reported that the
Farmers Cooperative Association, the largest cooperative in
Kansas has filed for Chapter 11 bankruptcy with over $10
million in debts. The cooperative is seeking lender and court
approval to continue operations during the bankruptcy
reorganization. A future issue of the Digest will contain an
article by Roger McEowen and Neil Harl on issues for
producers with grain or contracts with elevators who declare
bankruptcy.
FEDERAL AGRICULTURAL
PROGRAMS
ANIMAL WELFARE AC T. The Associated Press has
reported that the USDA has decided to settle the following
cas and promulgate minimum care standards for rats, mice
and birds used in research. The plaintiffs, a non-profit
organization, a private firm and an individual challenged
regulations promulgated under the Animal Welfare Act, 7
U.S.C. § 2131 et seq., which excluded birds, rats and mice
from the definition of animals covered by the Act. The
USDA challenged the standing of the individual plaintiff,
arguing that the plaintiff had not suffered any injury from the
regulations. The individual was a research lab assistant and
claimed emotional distress from the poor living conditions of
the mice and rats under the individual’s care. The court held
that the individual’s emotional distress was sufficient injury
for standing to sue and that the lack of regulation of the care
of the mice and rats resulted from the USDA’s failure to
promulgate regulations covering mice and rats. The court also
held t at the Act did not give the USDA unreviewable
discreti n to determine which animals were to be regulated.
The Act defined the covered animals as “any live or dead
dog, at, monkey (non-human primate mammal), guinea pig,
hamster, rabbit, or such other warm-blooded animal . . ..” The
court refused to grant a summary judgment for either party
because insufficient evidence had been presented to
determin  whether the regulations were reasonable under the
Act. Alternatives Research & Development v. Glickman,
101 F. Supp.2d 7 (D. D.C. 2000); see p. 139 supra.
CROP INSURANCE.    The FCIC has issued proposed
regulations amending the forage seeding crop insurance
provisions by (1) adding a new contract change date for
South Dakota counties where the special provisions designate
both fall and spring final planting dates; (2) adding
cancellation and termination dates for South Dakota counties
that will be applicable when the special provisions designate
both fall and spring final planting dates; and (3) adding end
of insurance period dates for fall and spring planted acreage
in California, Colorado, Idaho, Nebraska, Nevada, Oregon,
Utah and Washington. 65 Fed. Reg. 57562 (Sept. 25, 2000).
FEDERAL ESTATE
AND GIFT TAX
MARITAL DEDUCTION. The decedent’s estate passed
in trust to two trusts for the surviving spouse, marital and
onm rital trusts. The trustee filed the estate tax return and
afterwards wanted to split the marital trust into GSTT exempt
an  non xempt shares, with a reverse-QTIP election for the
exempt share. The IRS ruled that the estate would be granted
a 30 day extension to file the appropriate elections. Ltr. Rul.
200039035, June 26, 2000.
VALUATION. The decedent owned an interest in a
consumer electronics retail store. The issue was the value of
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the decedent’s interest in the store. The court valued the
nonoperating assets, those assets of the store not needed for
income, using an asset value approach. The court valued the
operating assets using the income approach, after increasing
store income by the amount of overcompensation of
employees related to the decedent. Estate of Renier v.
Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-298.
FEDERAL INCOME
TAXATION
C CORPORATIONS-ALM  § 7.02[3].*
CONSTRUCTIVE DIVIDENDS. The taxpayer owned a
business as a sole proprietor before incorporating the
business. The taxpayer had income and expenses accrued
prior to incorporation and those items were listed as
receivables and payables on the corporation’s books. The
receivables were considered valid debt of the taxpayer. The
taxpayer was charged with failing to report income and the
corporation paid the legal defense fees but charged the
payments to the taxpayer by reducing the receivables
resulting from the pre-incorporation income. The court held
that the reduction of the taxpayer’s debt to the corporation by
the amount of legal fees was a constructive dividend to the
taxpayer. Midwest Stainless, Inc. v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo.
2000-314.
CASUALTY LOSS . The taxpayer owned an apartment
building with a basis of $672.093 and a fair market value of
$2 million. The building suffered flood damage, reducing the
fair market value to $750,000. The taxpayer received
insurance proceeds of $767,000 and used the proceeds and
$483,000 of the taxpayer’s own money to repair the damage.
The court calculated the allowed loss deduction under I.R.C.
§ 165(a) of zero as follows: (1) the loss was $672,093, the
lesser of the decrease in fair market value and the adjusted
basis in the property before the casualty and (2) the deduction
was limited to the amount of loss, $672,093, not compensated
by insurance. Since the insurance proceeds, $750,000,
exceeded the loss of $672,093, no loss deduction was
allowed. LaFavre v. Comm’r, T.C. Memo. 2000-297.
COURT AWARDS AND SETTLEMENTS . The
taxpayer filed a suit against a mortgage lender for fraudulent
misrepresentation, negligent misrepresentation, and negligent
processing of the application for a veteran’s home mortgage
loan. The pleadings were later amended to include claims of
intentional infliction of emotional distress and punitive
damages. The jury awarded compensatory damages and
punitive damages but did not find the lender liable on the
claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress. The
taxpayer argued that the punitive damages were excludible
from income because the suit was based on personal tort
injuries. The court held that the punitive damages were
included in income because (1) the lender was held not liable
for any personal injury and (2) infliction of emotion distress
was not a physical personal injury. Brandriet v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2000-302.
DEPENDENTS. In a Chief Counsel Advice, the IRS ruled
that the parents of a kidnapped child may claim a dependency
exemp ion for the child in the year of the kidnapping but may
not cl im the exemption in later tax years in which the child
remained missing and the parents maintained a room for the
child and incurred search expenses. Even though the IRS
applied a presumption of support for the year of the
kidnapping, the presumption was not applied in later years,
even though the first presumption arose because no one else
was eligible for the exemption. The discussion did not raise
the issue of the survival of the child in the later years. On
reconsideration the IRS ruled that the dependent exemption
would be allowed in this case for the years that the child was
missing. CCA Ltr. Rul. 200038059, Sept. 22, 2000,
revoking, CCA Ltr. Rul. 200034029, July 25, 2000.
DISCHARGE OF INDEBTEDNESS. The taxpayer
participated in a program provided by a casino under which
the taxpayer signed a gambling marker under the
understanding that if the gambling net proceeds produced a
l ss, the amount the taxpayer owed on the marker would be
discount d by a prearranged amount. The IRS ruled that the
arrangement was a prenegotiated sale of entertainment
services, gambling, and that the discount was not discharge of
indebtedness income but a purchase price adjustment. The
IRS focused on the factors that the transaction was a sale of
services and that the discount was prearranged as part of an
i centive for the sale of the services. The IRS did not rule out
a similar result for non-prenegotiated transactions, but stated
that such circumstances would be more difficult to meet the
purchase price adjustment requirement. Ltr. Rul. 200039037,
July 27, 2000.
EMPLOYEE EXPENSES . The IRS has issued revenue
procedures updating Rev. Proc. 2000-9, I.R.B. 2000-21, 280,
which provide rules under which the amount of ordinary and
necessary business expenses of an employee for lodging,
meals, and incidental expenses or for meals and incidental
expens s incurred while traveling away from home will be
deemed substantiated under Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.274-5T
when a payor (the employer, its agent, or a third party)
provides a per diem allowance under a reimbursement or
other expense allowance arrangement to pay for such
expenses. This revenue procedure also provides an optional
method for employees and self-employed individuals to use
in computing the deductible costs of business meal and
incidental expenses paid or incurred while traveling away
from home. Use of a method described in this revenue
procedure is not mandatory and a taxpayer may use actual
allowable expenses if the taxpayer maintains adequate
records or other sufficient evidence for proper substantiation.
This revenue procedure does not provide rules under which
the amount of an employee's lodging expenses will be
deemed substantiated when a payor provides an allowance to
pay for those expenses but not meals and incidental expenses.
Rev. Proc. 2000-39, I.R.B. 2000-__.
HOBBY LOSSES. The taxpayers, husband and wife,
operated a horse breeding and boarding operation and were
employed fulltime at other jobs. The court held that the
taxpayers operated the horse breeding and boarding activity
with the intent to make a profit because (1) the taxpayers had
a business plan and complete records and the taxpayers
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increased the boarding activity to increase revenue while
developing the breeding activity; (2) the wife had extensive
personal expertise with horses and the husband had
considerable expertise in running a business; and (3) the
taxpayers and their daughter spent considerable time on the
activity. The court held that the other factors of Treas. Reg. §
183-2(b) were neutral, primarily because the taxpayers had
only operated the activity for four years and were still
developing the business. The court noted that the activity
produced substantial amount of recreation for the taxpayers
and their daughter but also noted that the taxpayers planned
to use the income from the activity to fund their retirement,
indicating a long-term profit motive. Str ckland v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2000-309.
LIKE-KIND EXCHANGES . The taxpayer transferred
property under a “reverse Starker” (see Stark r v. United
States,602 F.2d 1341 (9th Cir. 1979)) exchange; that is, the
replacement property was purchased by the taxpayer, with
title in the name of an intermediary, before the relinquished
property was sold, with the contract of sale assigned to the
intermediary who then passed title to the taxpayer. The
taxpayer argued that the safe harbor rules of Treas. Reg. §
1.1031(k)-1 should be applied to the transaction to qualify the
intermediary and to qualify the exchange for like-kind
exchange treatment. In a technical advice memorandum, the
IRS ruled that the safe harbor rules applied only where the
taxpayer does not purchase the replacement property prior to
exchange of the relinquished property. The IRS ruled that,
although title to the replacement property was taken by the
intermediary, the taxpayer negotiated for, paid for and was
personally liable on the purchase money mortgage for the
replacement property and all this occurred prior to the
exchange of properties by the intermediary. TAM Ltr Rul.
200039005, May 31, 2000.
PASSIVE ACTIVITY INCOME . The taxpayer owned
five grantor trusts which owned several historical buildings.
The buildings were renovated and leased to a C corporation
wholly-owned by the taxpayer for use in the corporation’s
business. The taxpayer claimed rehabilitation credit for the
renovations and characterized the rent income as passive
investment income. The IRS denied the credit because the
IRS recharacterized the rental income as nonpassive under
the “self-rented” property rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.469-2(f)(6)
and the attribution rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.469-4(a). The
taxpayer attacked the validity of the regulations as exceeding
the IRS authority under the statute. The court upheld the
regulations and held that the characterization of the rental
income as nonpassive caused the taxpayer to be ineligible for
the rehabilitation credit. Sidell v. Comm’r, 2000-2 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,751 (1st Cir. 2000), aff’g, T.C. Memo.
1999-301.
PENSION PLANS. The IRS has issued a revenue
procedure by which a plan administrator or plan sponsor may
obtain approval of the Secretary of the Treasury for a change
in funding method as provided by I.R.C. §§ 412(c)(5)(A),
302(c)(5)(A). Rev. Proc. 2000-41, I.R.B. 2000-__.
The IRS has issued a revenue procedure which provides
approval to change the funding method used to determine the
minimum funding standard for defined benefit plans to one of
sevente n methods, including a change in the asset valuation
method to one of six asset valuation methods, a change in the
valuation date to the first day of the plan year, a change in the
method for valuing ancillary benefits to the method used to
value retirement benefits and  certain changes that become
necessary or expedient under special circumstances.  Any
changes in funding method under this revenue procedure
must satisfy the rules concerning the continued maintenance
of certain amortization bases, the creation of an amortization
b se resulting from the change in method (method change
base), an  the amortization period for the method change
base. Taxpayers, plan administrators, and enrolled actuaries
are cautioned to consider the overall restrictions for use of
this procedure, the additional restrictions for approval of any
of the changes, and specific restrictions described under each
of the approvals. Approval for changes not provided by this
revenue procedure may be requested from the IRS. Rev.
Proc. 2000-40, I.R.B. 2000-__.
For plans beginning in September 2000, the weighted
average is 5.96 percent with the permissible range of 5.36 to
6.26 percent (90 to 106 percent permissible range) and 5.38
to 6.56 percent (90 to 110 percent permissible range) for
purposes of determining the full funding limitation under
I.R.C. § 412(c)(7).  Notice 2000-42, I.R.B. 2000-29, 302.
S CORPORATIONS-ALM § 7.02[3][c].*
SHAREHOLDER. The taxpayer, the taxpayer’s son and an
unrelated party formed an S corporation in order to operate
a  auto dealership. The unrelated party was supposed to
receive one-third of the stock and to loan the corporation
$25,000. The transfer of stock was not made contingent on
the loan and the loan provision did not state a date by which
the loan had to be made. The taxpayer became dissatisfied
with the unrelated party’s sales performance and the parties
executed an agreement to terminate the unrelated party’s
involvement with the corporation, including repayment of the
money loaned by the unrelated party. The agreement stated
that no stock had been issued and that the unrelated party’s
entitlement to the stock was terminated. The corporation had
filed several years of federal tax returns which included the
unrelated party as a one-third owner of the corporation. The
court held that the unrelated party was a one-third owner of
the corporation because, under state law, actual issuance of
stock was not required for ownership in a corporation and
because the corporation had treated the unrelated party as a
shareholder on the federal tax returns. Feraco v. Comm’r,
T.C. Memo. 2000-312.
SELF-EMPLOYMENT TAXES. The taxpayer was
assessed for self-employment taxes resulting from a
determination that the taxpayer was not an employee of a
commercial fishing vessel. The taxpayer pursued the
administrative appeals without success and filed an appeal
with the Tax Court. The court held that it did not have
jurisdiction over the case because the underlying tax liability
involved self-employment taxes. Anderson v. Comm’r, T.C.
Memo. 2000-311.
TAX SHELTERS . The defendants participated in
Morningstar Consultants in order to promote and sell the De-
Taxing America Program. The program purported to provide
step-by-step instructions for “removing” a program purchaser
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from the federal income and social security tax systems. The
program materials assured readers that the federal
government was without authority to tax them and that by
following the instructions outlined in the program individuals
could legally refuse to pay federal income and social security
tax. Several of Morningstar’s customers took steps to evade
the federal tax laws and filed false or fraudulent income tax
returns relying on the instructions and assertions made in the
program materials. The court held that the program was an
abusive tax shelter because the defendants made false
statements as to the tax benefits of the program. The court
upheld a permanent injunction against the defendants’
promotion and sale of the program. United States v.
Raymond, 2000-2 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶ 50,750 (7th Cir.
2000).
PARTNERSHIPS
DISSOLUTION. The plaintiff and defendant were
brothers who orally agreed to form a partnership to farm land
leased from their parents. The lease also included the lease of
livestock owned by the parents. The partnership was allowed
to use farm machinery and other parental assets without
charge. The parents executed a contract for deed to sell the
farm to the brothers with a retained life estate in the
homestead. The price of the sale was below fair market value
because the parties intended that the brothers would provide
for the parents’ needs for the rest of their lives; however, that
agreement was not written into the contract for deed. A
disagreement between the brothers arose when the plaintiff
wanted to build a house on a portion of the farm. The plaintiff
sued for dissolution of the partnership and division of the
partnership assets. The defendant argued that the dissolution
was a breach of fiduciary duty in that the purpose of the
partnership was to take care of their parents, as evidenced by
the transfer of the farm and the parents’ retention of the life
estate in exchange for the promise to take care of them. The
court found that a partnership existed and that the partnership
was a partnership at will, because no partnership term was
agreed to. The court also found that the partnership was not
bound by the promise to take care of the parents because that
promise was not written into the farm sale contract. The court
held that the partnership was at will because no definite term
was agreed to and no definite purpose was agreed to.
Because the partnership was at will, either partner could
require the dissolution of the partnership at any time;
therefore, the plaintiff did not violate any fiduciary duty in
seeking dissolution of the partnership. Mack v. Mack, 613
N.W.2d 64 (S.D. 2000).
SECURED TRANSACTIONS
FEDERAL DISASTER PAYMENTS. The defendant
had granted a security interest to the plaintiff in the
defendant’s crops and federal farm program payments. The
defendant defaulted on the secured loan and the plaintiff
requested that the defendant execute an assignment of federal
crop disaster payments to which the defendant was entitled.
The defendant refused to execute the assignment and the
plaintiff sued in a state court for an injunction to prevent the
efendant from using the federal disaster payments other than
to pay the loan. The defendant removed the action to federal
court and the plaintiff sought to remand the case back to state
c urt arguing that the federal court lacked jurisdiction
because no federal question was involved. The defendant
argued t at the assignment of federal farm disaster payments
was prohibited by federal regulations, 7 C.F.R. § 1477.109.
Th court held that the regulations were not intended to
pre mpt state secured transactions law; therefore, no federal
question existed in the case and the case was remanded back
to the state court. Ag Acceptance Corp. v. Nelson, 103 F.
Supp.2d 1129 (D. Minn. 2000).
ZONING
CONDITIONAL USE.  The plaintiff applied for a
conditional use permit to construct two hog confinement
facilities for over 6,000 pigs. The county board of
commissioners denied the permit because (1) the facilities
would impact the local roads, create pollution and create
undue risk of offensive odors; (2) the manure spreading
c ntrac s did not accurately identify the land to be used; (3)
the s ate and county did not have sufficient resources to
monitor the facilities; and (4) the permit would not promote
the public health, safety and welfare. The trial court upheld
the board’s decision and granted the board a directed verdict,
a ding a holding that the plaintiff had failed to provide
evidence of attempts to minimize offensive odors. The
plaintiff argued that the performance standards set forth in the
county ordinance were the sole criteria in determining
whether a permit should be granted. The board had
considered other factors and the court held that the permit
approval consideration should involve all relevant factors and
not just the criteria in the performance standards set forth in
t  ordinance. However, the court held that factor (3) above
was not a proper consideration for the permit since it was
b yond the control of the plaintiff. The court also held that
factor (1) was not proper if the harm caused to the roads
could be mitigated by conditions attached to the permit. The
court held that, because factor (1) was not fully explored as to
mitigating conditions and factor 2 was improperly
considered, a direct verdict was improper. The court held that
the directed verdict was also improper because the plaintiff
had presented evidence of how the plaintiff planned to
minimize odors and pollution from the facilities, raising a
fact issue as to whether these efforts were sufficient to grant
the permit. The court remanded the case back to the board for
determinations in accord with these holdings. In re
Conditional Use Permit Denied to Meier, 613 N.W.2d 523
(S.D. 2000).
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The Agricultural Law Press presents
AGRICULTURAL TAX AND LAW SEMINARS
in St. Augustine, Florida
by Neil E. Harl and Roger A. McEowen
January 9-12, 2001 Hampton Inn, St. Augustine Beach, Florida
Come join us in America’s vacationland for expert and practical seminars on the essential aspects of agricultural tax and
law. Gain insight and understanding from two of the nation’s top instructors while enjoying the warm breezes and historic
backdrop of St. Augustine, Florida.
The seminars will be Tuesday, Wednesday, Thursday, and Friday, January 9-12, 2001 at the beach side Hampton Inn St.
Augustine Beach, Florida. Registrants may attend one, two, three or all four days, with separate pricing for each
combination. On Tuesday, Roger McEowen will cover current developments in many areas of agricultural law. On
Wednesday, Roger McEowen will cover farm and ranch business planning. On Thursday, Dr. Harl will cover farm and
ranch estate planning. On Friday, Dr. Harl will speak about farm and ranch income tax. Your registration fee includes
comprehensive annotated seminar materials for the days attended which will be updated just prior to the seminar. The
seminar materials will also be available on CD-ROM for a small additional charge.
Here are some of the major topics to be covered:
• Legal developments in farm contracts, secured transactions, bankruptcy, real property, water law, torts, and
environmental law.
• Organizing the farm business--one entity or two, corporations, general and limited partnerships and limited liability
companies.
• Taxation of debt, taxation of bankruptcy, the latest on SE tax of rental of land to a family-owned entity; income
averaging; earned income credit; commodity futures transactions; paying wages in kind.
• Federal estate tax, including 15-year installment payment of federal estate tax, co-ownership discounts, alternate
valuation date, special use valuation, family-owned business deduction (FOBD), handling life insurance, marital deduction
planning, disclaimers, planning to minimize tax over deaths of both spouses, trusts, and generation skipping transfer tax.
• Gifts and federal gift tax, including problems with future interests, handling estate freezes, and “hidden” gifts.
• Income tax aspects of property transfer, including income in respect of decedent, installment sales, private annuities,
self-canceling installment notes, and part gift/part sale transactions.
The Hampton Inn provides a full vacationland experience, from white sandy beaches to plentiful golf. Special room
discounted rates are available at the hotel for seminar attendees. See our brochure or web site for more details.
The seminar registration fees    for current subscribers    to the Agricultural Law Digest, the Agricultural Law Manual, or
Principles of Agricultural Law are $175 (one day), $340 (two days), $490 (three days), and $620 (four days).  The
registration fees for     n nsubscribers    are $195, $380, $550 and $700, respectively. Please Note: the registration fees are
higher for registrations within 20 days prior to the seminar, so please call for availability and the correct fees. More
information and a registration form is available online at www.agrilawpress.com
For more information, call/fax Robert Achenbach at 1-541-302-1958, or e-mail to robe t@agr awpress.com
